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AGAPEIST ETHICS IN  
GIOVANNI PAPINI’S  






La Storia di Cristo (1921) di Giovanni Papini ha segnato l’inizio di una nuova fase 
nel tortuoso viaggio intellettuale e spirituale dal suo originario ateismo. In questa 
biografia leggermente romanzata, egli ha posto l’accento sull’etica dell’assoluta 
rinuncia del sé di Gesù, come appare nel Sermone sul Monte, con particolare 
attenzione alla non-resistenza di fronte alla violenza. In questo modo il pacifismo 
di Papini ha ricevuto un fondamento religioso. La sua meta-etica cristocentrica si 
opponeva diametralmente all’affidarsi alla legge naturale tipico della tradizione 
cattolica, che lentamente avrebbe perso molto del suo potere normativo nella 
teologia morale cattolica nel proseguio del ventesimo secolo. 
 
 
The publication of Giovanni Papini’s quasi-novelised biography of Jesus, 
Storia di Cristo in 1921 was one of many turning points in the tortuous 
intellectual and spiritual journey of this prominent Italian man of letters 
whom Ernesto Livorni justifiably placed among the “most prolific and 
influential intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century”.
1
 It was 
the first major fruit of his Catholic period, the terminus a qua of which 
can be imprecisely dated to the First World War. Papini’s metanoia at that 
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time was of no mean proportions. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 
1914, he had gained moderate renown in Italy as a radical intellectual, 
advocate of social reform, and atheist but, like many others of his 
generation, reached an unsatisfying impasse in an era of rapid cultural 
transition. In what many commentators regard as his most carefully 
crafted work, his autobiographical Un uomo finito (1912), he revealed his 
partial anomie in exploring the story of his soul. 
 It was therefore not surprising that while the war raged and seemed 
to threaten what remained of traditional European culture and stability, 
Papini sought a fundamentally new direction. That he found it through 
extensive reading of Christian and other religious texts, however, may 
have amazed some of his confrères. Expressions of his interest in spiritual 
matters were manifested inter alia in La paga del sabato (1915) and 
Polemichi religiose (1917). These works are not those of a mature 
Christian intellectual, but they pointed to what was to come after Panini 
emerged as a spiritually vibrant if theologically immature Catholic. 
Before the end of the war this native of Florence retreated from 
contentious urban life to a rustic area between the Tiber and Arno rivers to 
live among Tuscan peasants, whose uncomplicated lifestyle and 
unsophisticated piety appealed to him. Unlike much of the sceptical 
intelligentsia with whom Panini had associated for more than a decade 
before the war, they had remained faithful to their Catholic institutions, 
living their faith according to centuries-old traditions and, apparently, 
unsullied by the winds of intellectual and cultural change which had 
blown away the faith of many of their urbanised compatriots. It was 
through daily contact with these contadini that he discovered how 
meaningful the Bible could be to himself.
2
 Shortly thereafter, Papini 
began to write Storia di Cristo to present what he had accepted as the 
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essential truth of Jesus in what many readers of the original Italian text 
and numerous translations apparently perceived as a meaningful mooring 
in a world gone adrift. Papini’s attraction to the utterly non-nationalistic 
ethics of Jesus is all the more comprehensible against the backdrop of the 
intensely national sentiments which had contributed to and been 
magnified during the First World War. He clearly perceived in the New 
Testament the antidote to the poison which had again laid Europe low. 
 It is my intention in the present article to analyse contours of a 
central dimension of Storia di Cristo which is crucial to an understanding 
of Papini in general, namely his advocacy of Christocentric, agapeist 
ethics anchored in selfless love, particularly with regard to matters 
concerning war and violence. His stance in the early 1920s is noteworthy 
in terms of literary history, because it placed him at odds with the anti-
pacifist position of the Fascist movement which propelled Mussolini into 
power in 1922. But Papini, in another remarkable shift in his personal 
journey, would eventually embrace Fascism and dedicate his 1937 Storia 
della Letteratura Itaniana to Mussolini. 
 The noun agap‘ (together with its nominal and verbal derivatives) is 
one of the most important concepts in the New Testament. As discussed 
below, it refers to selfless love inspired by God. It occurs only a few times 
in the gospels, with all but two of these occurrences in the Gospel of John. 
The most familiar of these is in John 13:34-35, where, at the Last Supper, 
Jesus famously says, “A new commandment I give you: Love one 
another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another.” The 
Johannine epistles also employ agap‘, e.g. I John 3:18: “Dear children, let 
us not love with words or tongue but with actions and in truth,” and I John 
4:8: “Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love.” 
Dozens of occurrences in the Pauline epistles, most notably in I 
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Corinthians 13, supplement these instances. As generally used by 
specialists in Christian ethics, “agapeist ethics” is an approach to ethical 
decision making based not on the minutiae of specific prescriptions 
designed to address a variety of problems in life, but teleologically, 
proceeding from the general principle of divine love and adapting one’s 
conduct toserve the goal of distributing that love to others and to the 
general good of all. 
 
The Historical Context of Papini’s Pacifism 
 
Papini and every other Catholic of his era who professed pacifist views 
dissented markedly from a normal position which had existed in their 
branch of Christianity for nearly 1,500 years. To the extent that one may 
generalise succinctly about a massive and historically complicated topic in 
the history of Christian theology, Catholic moral teaching about violence 
and war has been derived in large part from natural law, i.e. the 
supposedly inherent principles which imbued all of God’s creation from 
the outset and can be discerned by non-Christians and Christians alike. 
This was one root of the classic “just war” theory which in the history of 
Western civilisation was born in classical Greece where Plato, among 
others, advanced it, taken over by Augustine early in the fifth century and 
incorporated by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century in his Summa 
Theologica. Particularly in its Thomistic expression, it became the 
normative and influential Catholic position with regard to international 
violence from the Middle Ages until the twentieth century. 
 Closely following Augustine but making only scant reference to the 
Bible, Aquinas propounded three fundamental conditions for a war to be 
just. The first was “the authority of the sovereign by whose command the 
war is to be waged”; it was not to be undertaken by private individuals. 
The second was “a just cause”, “namely that those who are attacked, 
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should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.” 
Finally, “it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful 
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance 
of evil.” Aquinas quoted Augustine uncritically: “True religion looks 
upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of 
aggrandisement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of 
punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”
3
 This obviously left no 
room for absolute pacifism, notwithstanding the fact that dissenting 
individual Catholics had played prominent roles in peace movements 
since the nineteenth century, including many of those in Italy cited above 
and some, clearly a minuscule minority, had eschewed violence 
altogether. 
 Looking ahead contextually, the “just war” theory has remained 
normative in Roman Catholic moral theology, although a document issued 
by the Second Vatican Council in 1965 opened the door to differing 
interpretations. Gaudium et spes, which addressed a wide array of issues 
confronting Christianity in the twentieth century, by no means adopted a 
pacifist position. However, it acknowledged the legitimacy of various 
responses to the scourge of warfare in an age when the bitter fruits of 
nuclear physics and other natural sciences had facilitated devastation on 
an even greater scale than in the past. Its drafters accordingly declared, 
“Eodem spiritu moti, non possumus non laudare eos, qui in iuribus 
vindicandis actioni violentae renuntiantes, ad media defensionis recurrunt 
quae ceteroquin etiam debilioribus praesto sunt, dummodo hoc sine 
laesione iurium et obligationum aliorum vel communitatis fieri possit.” 
Yet Gaudium et spes also included words which reasserted a traditional 
justification of militarism: “Qui vero, patriae servitio addicti, in exercitu 
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versantur, et ipsi tamquam securitatis libertatisque populorum ministros 
sese habeant, et, dum hoc munere recte funguntur, vere ad pacem 
stabiliendam conferunt.” Furthermore, Gaudium et spes explicitly 
underscored that “Concilium ante omnia in memoriam revocare intendit 




 The historical context of Papini’s explicit rejection of the use of force 
and implicit rejection of the “just war” cannot be adequately understood 
apart from an awareness of the rudimentary history of pacifism in Europe, 
which, especially in its absolute form which totally rejected the legitimacy 
of armed conflict, even defensive resistance to unambiguous foreign 
aggression, was obviously light years removed from the “just war” 
doctrine. In brief, during the nineteenth century, as the Continent 
recovered from the trauma of the Napoleonic wars, numerous Christian 
and secular movements were initiated to foster greater international co-
operation, provide peaceful means of resolving tensions between nations, 
and otherwise reduce the likelihood of the scourge of armed conflict. 
Many resulting organisations existed by the 1830s, and they multiplied 
during the latter half of the century. Some took their cue from Christian 
ethics. This was in itself a highly significant development, because prior 
to the nineteenth century pacifism, especially pacifism of the absolute sort 
which denied the legitimacy of any use of force, regardless of the 
circumstances, had previously been the nearly exclusive province of the 
historic “peace churches”, such as the Society of Friends (or “Quakers”), 
various Anabaptist groups, the Church of the Brethren in Germany. This 
has been cogently argued by inter alia Peter Brock in his classic studies of 
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 Larger denominations, such as the Roman Catholic Church, the 
state Lutheran denominations in Scandinavia and numerous German 
principalities, and the Church of England had certainly not been of 
pacifist bent. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, 
much of the leadership of peace movements in one European country after 
another came from historically non-pacifist religious backgrounds. Other 
pacifists, both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were socialists 
who rejected war as a function of an ethically indefensible social and 
political structure rooted in bourgeois control. 
 Although Italy was never a major centre of this general movement, it 
eventually spawned a remarkable number of peace organisations. In 1868, 
for example, Timoteo Riboli founded in Torino the Lega di libertà, 
fratellanza e pace, which was affiliated with a parallel body in Geneva, 
the Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté. In its wake followed, to 
name but a few, the Unione lombarda per la pace e l’arbitrato 
internazionale, the Società della pace, the Società per la pace e l’arbitrato 
internazionale, and the Comitato delle signore per la pace et l’arbitrato 
internazionale. Like their counterparts abroad, Italian peace advocates 
published journals to advance their cause. Two were La Libertà e la pace, 
and La Vita internazionale.
6
 As in most other European countries, the fin 
de siècle witnessed the greatest growth of peace movements in Italy, and 
this continued until the outbreak of the First World War. As Sandi E. 
Cooper generalised in her cogent study of the subject, “The years 1899 to 
1914, a quarter-century filled with crisis and threats to the breakdown of 
peace, were also a twenty-five-year period of unremitting growth of both 
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national and international peace movements.”
7
 In Italy, most of the 
organisations in question co-operated to form at a congress held in Torino 
in 1904 a national body. This constituent assembly attracted more than 
150 official delegates from twenty-five societies. Indicative of the breadth 
of the movement’s appeal, there were also representatives from Masonic 
lodges, veterans’ organisations, universities, workers’s associations, 
feminist societies, socialist organisations, and political circles.
8
 
 Complicating matters for Italian pacifists of various hues, however, 
was the fact that their country was allied with expansionist, militarist 
Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance from 1882 until 
shortly before the outbreak of the First World War (despite the fact that 
Italy was a rival of Austria-Hungary for hegemony in the Balkans and for 
control of the Adriatic), and clamouring for a resolution, by arms if 
necessary, of the Italia irredenta issue. Italian pacifists were by no means 
of one mind with regard to these matters. After the turn of the century, 
Italian imperial aspirations in North Africa contributed to a fracturing of 
the peace movement on the home front, manifested especially in a conflict 
between rival factions led by Moneta and Edoardo Giretti, and its virtual 
collapse in 1911. It was thus in a climate of perennial international tension 
but cautious optimism that harmony among nations could be attained in 
part through activism that Papini began his career as a writer. The impact 
of the 1914-1918 war on peace activists was thus all the more sobering. 
 The extent to which Christianity directly influenced the peace 
movements in Italy and elsewhere is debatable. Unquestionably, large 
numbers of participants, regardless of their political and economic views, 
were secular people who would have ascribed their motivation to other 
factors. On the other hand, it has often been pointed out that many 
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individuals, such as the internationally renowned Russian author and 
pacifist Leo Tolstoy, found much of their motivation in the Sermon on the 
Mount with inter alia its ethic of turning the other cheek. When Papini, 
who had participated in peace movements before the First World War, 
turned with increasing vigour to the New Testament after the armistice, he 
found a message which resonated with his earlier convictions. 
 
Storia di Cristo 
 
Storia di Cristo is fairly described as a hybrid work, a retelling of its 
eponymous theme adapted with frequent smidgins of artistic licence and 
imbued a generous slathering of authorial commentary. Theologically, it 
is generally a conservative work which many Catholic theologians of that 
day undoubtedly could endorse, although a rigorous reading reveals that 
Papini did not hew as closely to the accounts of the gospels as earlier 
commentators tended to believe – a matter to which we shall return 
shortly. The account is divided into several dozen short chapters, the first 
few of which are devoted to a description of the world into which Jesus 
was born. Papini’s narration reflects his post-socialist conviction that the 
salvation of humanity lies less in the transformation of society than in the 
metamorphosis of individual souls.  
 Storia di Cristo has often been described as an account faithful to the 
New Testament portrayal of Jesus. Although much of it doggedly follows 
the contours of the texts of the gospels, one would deny Papini’s creativity 
by suggesting that he merely paraphrased their familiar story. Repeatedly 
he embedded in his tale fictional elements which can justly be labelled the 
hybrid fruits of Catholic tradition, authorial imagination, and unrestrained 
respect for the person of Jesus. Some of the earliest such dimensions 
occur in Papini’s presentation of the childhood of Jesus. “Nella casa di 
Nazaret Gesú medita sui comandamenti della Legge ma soltanto nei 
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Profeti, nelle parole di pianto e di fuoco dei Profeti, riconosce il suo 
destino.”Moreover, Papini declares,  he was supposedly aware of the 
minutest detail of everything that would befall him (82).
9
 The juvenile 
activities are also described from a fictional perspective: “Mentre Gesú, 
nello stambugio di Nazaret, maneggiava l’ascia e la squadra”, John the 
Baptist begins his prophetic ministry (88). There is no unambiguous 
Scriptural warrant for these musings. Nor will one find anywhere in the 
New Testament coverage for Papini’s description of the young Jesus in 
Galilee as a man deeply attached to nature: “Sempre cara gli fu quella 
costa solatía del suo Lago – lunto la conca d’acqua placida, limpida e 
serena, appena mossa dal vento del deserto, appena popolata dalle barche 
che bordeggiano silenziose e sembrano, da lontano, senza padroni” (115). 
The point is not to undermine Papini’s artistry with pettyfogging criticism 
but rather to emphasise the fact his willingness to enhance the biblical 
narrative in accordance with his own perceptions. 
 
Establishing the Contrast between Jesus and Judaism 
 
Papini’s presentation of the radical ethics of Jesus is predicated on the 
conviction that Jesus had fundamentally departed from Judaism and that 
there was little common ground between the message of the Gospel and 
Jewish religion of the first century or previously. Indeed, this is the 
lynchpin in Papini’s portrayal of Jesus as essentially a new departure from 
any preceding or contemporary belief system. The ethics of Jesus was for 
the young Italian writer a profoundly novel act on the stage of human 
history. This perception goes hand-in-hand with Papini’s commitment to 
the teachings of Jesus as special, or unique, revelation and his implicit 
rejection of natural law. 
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 Flowing through Storia di Cristo is an anti-Jewish subcurrent which 
repeatedly manifests itself. Papini, who after Mussolini’s accession to 
power would emerge as an unabashed anti-Semite, allowed his penchant 
for generalisation to affect much of his description of the ancient 
Hebrews. Benché pastorale piú che guerriero non fu mai in pace né con sé 
stesso né cogli altri,” he declared. “Guerregiò coi suoi vicini, coi suoi 
ospiti, coi suoi príncipi; guerregiò coi suoi Profeti e col suo stesso Dio. 
Marcio di scelleratezze, governato da omicidi, traditori, adulteri, 
incestuosi, briganti, simoniaci e idolatri, pure vide nasacere dalle sue 
donne, nelle sue case, i piú perfetti santi dell’Oriente: giusti, ammonitori, 
solitari, profeti” (76). Papini enlisted Jesus to corroborate his negative 
portrayal: “Sa che gli Ebrei, carnali, materiali, mondani, abbeverati di 
umiliazione, pieni di rancori e di mali pensieri, non aspettano un Messia 
povero, odiato e mansueto” (85). 
 Papini did not mince words or qualify his generalisations in 
describing the extent to which Jesus challenged accepted truths and 
inverted the values inherited from Jewish culture. History is punctuated by 
nonconformists, he conceded, “Ma il piú grane Rovesciatore è Gesú. Il 
supremo Paradossita, il Capovolgitore radicale e senza paura.” To Papini, 
a pivotal characteristic of Jesus and his message was that he refused to 
accept the supposed unalterability of human nature. “Egli ha detto al 
Passato, assiderato nella sua agonia, alla natura, troppo di buon grado 
ubbidita, all’Opinione universale e volgare, il piú reciso NO che la storia 
del mondo registri” (138). 
 
No Love in Judaism and Classical Antiquity? 
 
Papini’s argument about the novelty of Jesus’ demands for love collapses 
under the burden of his generalisations about the absence of love before 
the Sermon on the Mount was preached. This zealous convert clearly had 
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some awareness of pre-Christian cultures in the Mediterranean and other 
regions of the world hardly enough knowledge of them to justify certain 
categorical judgements he made about them. This is particularly obvious 
in his pivotal declaration about the non-existence of agap‘ in antiquity: “Il 
mondo antico non conosce l’Amore. Conosce la passione per la donna, 
l’amicizia per l’amico, la giustizia per il cittadino, l’ospitalità per il 
forestiero. Ma non conosce l’Amore” (172). 
 This qualification apparently reflects a basic awareness of the 
distinction in ancient and Hellenistic Greek between three terms for love, 
namely self-gratifying eros, the caring for friends and relatives in philia, 
and other-directed agap‘. However, Papini’s categorical denial of the 
existence of the third before it was demanded by Jesus as the basic 
commandment from which all others proceed is born of ignorance. 
Gerhard Kittel discussed the matter in considerable detail in his 
authoritative Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (which was 
not compiled until the early 1930s). He acknowledged that in pre-biblical 
Greek the meaning of the substantive agap‘ (and its verb forms) was 
sometimes imprecise and inconsistent but that in the main it denoted a 
showing of love, “a giving active love on the other’s behalf”. (By contrast, 
eros in pre-biblical Greek referred to the seeking in others “the fulfilment 
of its own life’s hunger”.) Kittel could cite numerous classical Greek 
usages in this sense.
10
 Of them, however, Papini evinced no cognisance. 
 Turning to Hellenistic Judaism of the period immediately before and 
concurrent with the ministry of Jesus, Kittel could point to “love for one’s 
neighbour” as “a favourite theme”, one which rested on the foundation of 
centuries of Jewish tradition. As early as the seventh century B.C. 
Menander the Sage, who, nota bene, had recorded an antecedent of what 
is known as the “Golden Rule” in Matthew 7:12, called attention to the 
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importance of love for one’s neighbour. The slightly older contemporary 
of Jesus, the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, made a systematic 
presentation of selfless love as a set of concentric circles progressing from 
the innermost (compatriots, proselytes, and neighbours) outward to 
enemies, slaves, animals, and plants, so that all of creation would be 
included as the objects of human love.
11
 
 Papini did not limit his generalisation about the non-existence of 
satisfactory, selfless love before Jesus to what in the history of Western 
civilisation is generally perceived as the ancient world. Looking much 
further east, he was certain that it was also absent in East Asia. Papini 
allowed that Gautama Siddharta, the founder of Buddhism, had 
“raccomandò l’amore per gli uomini, per tutti gli uomini, anche i piú 
miserabili e disprezzati.” But Papini found fault with this, as well: “Il 
buddista non ama il fratello per amor del fratello, ma per amor di sé 
stesso, cioè per scansare il dolore, per sopraffare l’egoismo, per avviarsi 
all’annullamento. Il suo amore universale è gelido e interessato, egoista 
[...]” (165-166). 
 
The Human Condition: the Reality of Fallen Man 
 
In the wake of the First World War, Papini apparently had no difficulty 
accepting the foundational doctrine of universal sin. His description of 
primal man particularly reveals his perception of what lay beneath the 
veneer of civilisation: “Gli uomini degli antichi tempi, gli uomini carnali, 
fisici, corporali, corpulenti, sanguigni, atticciati, ben costrutti, gli uomini 
dal pelo folto, dalla rossa faccia, mangiatori di carne cruda, sverginatori di 
vergini, rubatori d’armenti, sbranatori di nemici [...]” (144). In modern 
times, Papini observed, people were no better morally. “L’avarizia degli 
                                                 
11 Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Vol. I: 40. 
 
 34
uomini è tanto grande che ciascuno s’ingegna quanto può di prender 
molto dagli altri e di render poco,” he lamented. “Ognun di noi odia la 
maggior parte degli uomini coi quali vivi. Si odiano perché hanno piú di 
noi, perché non si, danno tutto quello che si vorrebbe, perché non si 
curano di noi, perché son diversi da noi, infine perché esistono.” In 
Papini’s world, this loathing of humanity has reached an extreme: 
“Arriviamo a odiare i nostri amici, anche quelli che ci hanno fatto il bene” 
(162). 
 The crucial question determining the course of the human species, as 
Papini posed it, was whether this state was fixed. “Sono gli uomini 
immutabili, non trasformabili, non migliorabili?” he asked. “Può invece 
l’uomo trasumanarsi, santificarsi, indíarsi?” Papini acknowledged that 
according to conventional, non-Christian wisdom, the answer was 
negative: “Molti hanno creduto e credono che della vita si posson cambiar 
le forme, ma non il fondo e che all’uomo tutto sarà dato fuorché cambiare 
la natura del suo spirito” (140-141). 
 
Jesus and the Transformation of Human Nature 
 
In presenting Jesus Christ as the only answer to the human predicament, 
Papini was obviously writing in the shadow of the war which had just 
devastated wide areas of Europe and obliterated the remnant of 
international public optimism that had endured until 1914. The appeal to 
him, and to a new generation of pacifists in one country after another, of a 
radically non-violent ethic was therefore understandable. Papini asserted 
categorically that “il comando di Cristo è l’unico che possa risolvere il 
problema della violenza.” The stakes were high; nothing less than the 
future of the world hinged on its truth and its acceptance. “Se Cristo ha 
sbagliato non ci resta che la negazione assoluta e universale e il volontario 
annullamento,” he judged (87, 142). 
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 In Storia di Cristo, Papini effectively adopted a radically dissenting 
position, a Christocentric one grounded not in generalised natural law but 
in the specific teachings of Jesus Christ. To Papini, natural law was not 
the final word, but something which had been subordinated to the Gospel. 
Of course, he conceded, “La non resistenza al male repugna 
profondamente alla nostra natura.” But however deeply rooted the instinct 
of survival was in natural man, it was not fixed, for “Gesú esiste perché la 
nostra natura arrivi a sentire schifo di quel che oggi le piace e ami quel 
che ieri le faceva orrore. Ogni sua parola presuppone questa totale 
rinnovazione dello spirito umano” (158). 
 How is this accomplished? Papini’s reading of the gospels, and 
especially the Sermon on the Mount, gave him an answer which, to be 
sure, many other Catholic and non-Catholic Christians would have 
rejected. For him in the early 1920s it lay not in the restructuring of 
society or the rearrangement of international relations, but rather in the 
total transformation of human nature on an individual basis. This, Papini 
believed, was possible only through Jesus Christ. His reading of Matthew 
7:43-48 challenged him with the key to the radical renewal of humanity 
and the consequences thereof: 
 
Voi avete udito che fu detto: Ama il tuo prossimo e odia tuo 
nemico Ma io vi dico: Amate i vostri nemici, benedite quelli 
che vi maledicono, fate del bene a quelli che v’odiano, 
pregate per quelli che vi fanno torto, che vi oltraggiano, che 
vi persequitano. Affinché siate imitatori del Padre vostro che 
è ne’ cieli; poiché Egli fa levare il suo sole sopra i malvagi e 
sopra i buoni e fa piovere sui giusti e sugli inguisti. Perché, 
se amate quelli che vi amano, che merito ne avete? Non 
fanno anche i pubblicani lo stesso? E se fate accoglienza 
soltanto ai vostri fratelli, che fate di singolare? Non fanno 
anche i pagani altrettanto? Voi dunque siate perfetti com’ è 
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perfetto il Padre Vostro celeste. 
 
To Papini, these six verses were “la magna carta della nuova razza, della 
terza razza non ancora nata.” He identified the first two as the “Bestie 
senza Legge e il suo nome fu guerra”, and the second as the “Barbari 
dirozzati dalla Legge e la sua piú alta perfezione fu la Guistizia.” 
Infinitely higher would the third soar; it would be “non somiglianti alle 
Bestie ma a Dio” (175). This transition could be effected only by the man-
God Jesus. Yet to Papini, humanity seemed halfway to that goal: “La 
divinità è in noi; la bestialità la fascia e la stringe come una mala corteccia 
che ritarda la nostra crescenza.” Attaining the final stage required, in his 
bold words, that “noi dobbiamo incielare, indíare, trasumanare noi stessi; 
diventare simile a Dio; imitare Iddio” (177). Such achievements were 
possible through following without inhibition the commandment of Jesus 
to love one another as God has loved us (John 13:34). This implied loving 
universally, not merely one’s neighbours, but also one’s enemies.  
“L’amore per i nemici, alla ragione comune sembra pazzia,” confessed 
Papini in another confrontation with conventional, worldly wisdom. 
“L’amore per i nemici rassomiglia all’odio per noi medesimi” (177). 
 
Sheep and Goats 
 
A further New Testament text which Papini used, although with 
surprisingly brief commentary, given its frequent employment in agapeist 
interpretations of the ethics of Jesus, is Matthew 25:31-46. In this parable, 
Jesus suggests that at the end of history people will be judged like sheep 
and goats according to whether they evinced practical love for others. 
Papini quoted the text at length before declaring that the extension of love 
to “i poveri e gli infelici” could be adequately described as “pietà”. In 
explaining the words of Jesus that by extending mercy in various ways to 
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the disadvantaged people actually were doing the same to him, Papini 
professed that from the first century until the present day Jesus has lived 
spiritually “sotto la specie dei poveri e dei pellegrini, dei malati e dei 
martoriati, dei vagabondi e degli schiavi”. Rather than justification by 
faith, eternal salvation would result be the reward for deeds of love. The 
concluding words in Papini’s treatment of this parable are a lucid 
reflection of the conventional Catholic position on the relationship of 
works to salvation: “Il grande povero, nel giorno della sua gloria, 
retribuirà ciascuno colle sue infinite ricchezze, secondo giustizia” (360). 
The extent to which he drew his inspiration from this text is impossible to 
ascertain. In any case, Papini’s commentary on it is much briefer than his 
treatment of the teaching of non-resistance in the Sermon on the Mount. 
This imbalance may stem from the fact that the mercy in Matthew 25:31-
46 was not in itself controversial at any time, whereas of course the 
pacifism inherent in Papini’s interpretation of the injunction to love one’s 
enemies had been a matter of intense debate throughout his career. 
 
“Preghiera a Cristo” 
 
The final evidence of Papini’s agapeist ethic and how far he was from the 
ethos of Fascism in 1921 is manifest in the ultimate chapter of Storia di 
Cristo, “Preghiera a Cristo”. In these eight pages, he bared his soul on 
behalf of humanity. Our species, he lamented, was living in misery and 
despair. Papini pinpointed many causes of this woeful condition. Among 
the foremost which had recently exacerbated it was the devastation of the 
First World War. Sharing a widespread sentiment, he did not mince words 
in condemning its economic roots and what it had wrought: 
 
 Il mondo, per quattr’ anni interi, s’è imbrattato di sangue 
per decidere chi dovera aver l’aiola piú grande e il piú grosso 
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marsupio. I servitori di Mammona hanno cacciato Calibano 
in opposte interminabili fosse per diventare piú ricchi e 
impoverire i nemici. Ma questa spaventevole esperienza non 
ha giovato a nessuno. Piú poveri tutti di prima, piú affamati 
di prima, ogni gente è tornata ai piedi di fango del dio 
negozio a sacrificargli la pace propria e la vita altrui (558). 
 
In the wake of the war, humanity as Papini knew it had sunk even deeper 
into the abyss and removed itself further from the spirit of Christ: “Tutte 
le fedi, in questo marame infetto, smortiscono e si disfanno. Una sola 
religione pratica il mondo, quelle che riconosce la somma trinità di 
Wotan, Mammona e Priapo; la Forza che ha per simbolo la spada e per 
tempio la caserma; la Ricchezza che ha per simbolo l’oro e per tempio la 
borsa; la Carne che ha per simbolo il phallus e per tempio il bordello” 
(559). 
 In retrospect, Papini’s forebodings of the consequences of this 
idolatry seem particularly prescient. Humanity in general had failed to 
learn anything  from recent history which had left “immanti armenti di 
cadaveri infraciditi”, and the carnage would therefore continue: “Eppure, 
come se tutti quei morti non fossero che una prima rata dell’universale 
distruzione, seguitano ad uccidersi e ad uccidere.” International relations, 
despite the creation of the League of Nations, remained in disarray, and 
oppression continued. “Le nazioni opulente condannano alla fame le 
nazioni povere,” while “nuovi dittatori, profittando dello sfasciume di tutti 
i sistemi e di tutti i regimi, conducono intere nazioni alla carestia, alla 
strage e alle dissoluzione” (557). Published a year before the accession of 
Mussolini, Papini’s words read like an epitaph on the tombstone of Italian 






The radically selfless ethical demands made in the Sermon on the Mount 
have been variously interpreted during the history of Christianity. In 
medieval Catholicism, they were classified as “evangelical counsels”, 
together with chastity, obedience, and poverty, which were typically 
incorporated in monastic vows, rather than commandments to be imposed 
on all Christians. Papini, of course, like many other Christian pacifists, 
both Catholic and non-Catholic, did not recognise the validity of this 
distinction. To him, the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount were 
directed at Christians in general, not a spiritual elite among them. 
 By no means was Papini the first prominent European man of letters 
to regard them as generally binding, as the well-known case of Leo 
Tolstoy (1828-1910) demonstrates. By the 1860s this Russian novelist had 
achieved international renown but, by his own testimony, was living a 
spiritually vacuous life until he repeatedly read the Sermon on the Mount 
“with the same emotional ardor”, especially when he encountered “the 
verses which exhort the hearer to turn the other cheek, to give up his 
cloak, to be at peace with all the world, to love his enemies”. This proved 
to be an epiphany experience which changed his life, though only after he 
had wrestled with it for years and, in his view, been misled by biblical 
commentaries which sought to dilute the injunctions of Jesus. He 
eventually dispensed with the commentaries and concluded, “It seems, 
then, that Jesus meant precisely what he said.” Tolstoy lamented that “and 
yet neither believers nor unbelievers will admit this simple and clear 
interpretation of Jesus’ words.”
12
 A former army officer who has 
experienced the horrors of combat in the Crimean War, Tolstoy responded 
by becoming one of the most visible Christian pacifists of his era. 
 Papini later supported Fascism and lauded Mussolini personally, 
even though the Fascist ethos was diametrically opposed to the agapeism 
                                                 
12 L.N. Tolstoï, My Religion (London: Walter Scott, 1889): 5, 11-12. 
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espoused in Storia di Cristo. That this Catholic intellectual would endorse 
a nationalist, imperialist movement and a man whose relations with the 
Roman Catholic Church were at times strained is not entirely ironic or 
without precedent. As has been repeatedly noted for many decades, at 
times both the Italian fascist movement and parallel ones elsewhere had 
millions of supporters among both the priesthood and the laity of the 
Church of Rome. The notion of the corporatist state, according to some of 
its apologists, resonated with the papal social encyclicals Rerum Novarum 
(1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Furthermore, Mussolini’s 
hostility to Italian Jewry reverberated with Papini’s unvarnished anti-
Semitism. When juxtaposed with the radically agapeist morality set forth 
in Storia di Cristo, Papini’s eventual enthusiasm for Fascism underscored 
the magnitude of his political metamorphosis. 
 Finally, seen in the historical context of Christian ethics, Papini’s 
agapeist ethics, focussing on the love of Jesus, is particularly significant 
because it anticipated a major shift in Catholic moral theology. Prior to 
the Second World War, natural law in the Thomistic tradition held the 
field within Catholic meta-ethical thought. As the eminent historian of 
Christian morality J. Philip Wogaman has pointed out, however, during 
the latter half of the twentieth century moral theologians such as the 
German Bernard Häring (1912-1998) and the American John Courtney 
Murray (1904-1967) (the latter of whom, to be sure, remained partly 
committed to a grounding in natural law) brought about a general shift of 
emphasis towards a more directly biblical and christological one while 
simultaneously arguing for individual responsibility in ethical decision-
making and ecclesiastical freedom rather than a continuation of the 
traditional, paternalistic state church model which had been normative in 
Catholicism since it had become the official religion of the Roman Empire 
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in the fourth century.
13
 It would be folly to suggest that Papini laid the 
foundation for this fundamental change and erroneous to believe that he 
was the only Catholic thinker of the 1920s who anticipated it. However, 
any serious study of Papini’s eclectic ethical thought must take note of 
how this professional littérateur and amateur student of the Bible 
challenged readers to follow revelation rather than reason more than four 
decades before the Second Vatican Council legitimised this crucial meta-
ethical revolution. 
 
(University of Stellenbosch) 
                                                 
13 J. Philip Wogaman, Christian Ethics: A Historical Introduction (London: Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 1993): 235-237. 
